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[lto ']
AN AI:CE ACPC;S[; THE PACIFIC
by Mike

~ansfield

The historian Henry Brooks Adams
experience is an arch to build upon."

~.,rrote

He \vas

in 1907 that "all
~niting ,

about his

own education, but it is an apt thought about the experience of
nations as well.

I have 1n mind, for example, the experience

of Japan and the United States .

In the years since the end of

tl:e Second Horld h'ar Japan has emerged as a major economic
Its relations with the v1orld and especially with the

po•.-.rer.

United States have broadened and become increasingly complex .
.Curing the past ten years alone , there has been a significant
strengthening of the relationship between our two nations.

We

have used the ra\1 materials of our past experience as an arch
to bridge the the occasional troubled waters in our trade
relations or to reach agreements on the issue of regional
security.

And today our partnership across the Pacific is

stronger and our relations more interwoven than ever before.
I want to reflect on the construction of that
partnership, especi a lly during the past decade.

\l"ben this

magazine, Trends, was first published in the fall of 1971, just
one decade ago,

the United States and Japan \Jere experiencins a

relationship that had all the ups and downs of a 1\!ontana
horizon.

The 19GO Security ':'reaty had just the year before

reached the age when either side could give one year's notice
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of its abrogation.
fact.

A good deal of attention was given that

tlore than 700, 000 people throughout Japan demonstrated

against the Treaty on June 23 of that yea r.

But our

governments and the majorities they rep rensente d were able to
weather that storn and reconfirm the value of the agreement
which has meant so much to our mutual security.
hnd t he day after the

~ecurity

Treaty demonst r ations

there was, in Washington, D.C., a breakdown in the textile
negotiations.

This

our two nations.

~;as

the first sharp trade conflict betHeen

The deadlock in the negotiations was fixed on

the time limit that voluntary quotas wou ld remain i n effect.
The Japanese negotiators pressed for a one year li mit while our
side insisted on three.

The economic facts of the discussion

were confused by threats of protectionist legislation from the
hfter years of offers and counter-offers across the

Congress.

Pacific both sides groped their way to an acceptable agreement
to licit Japanese exports of textiles to the United Staten.
Then ther e were the discussions regarding the reversion
of CJ.:: inaHa.

Although Prime Minister Sate and President Nixon

had agreed on l-Tovember 21, 1969, that

Okina~1a

would be restored

to Japan in 1972, many technical problems haC to be worked
out.

The tim e was difficult.

in th e VietnaM conflict.

were ending our involvement

There \lere questions about whether

the limitations of the 1960
GJ..: i na .... a.

~~

~ecurity

Treaty shoulc apply to

Together, in spite of the difficult times and

-

3 -

difficult questions , we came to satisfactory agreements .
But all these events , landma r ks of the early 1970s,
changed the relationship between the two coun tri es .
matured anJ entered "the age of choice ."
became aware it was dealing with an equal .

Japan

The United States
Significantly ,

there was not a single demonstration asainst the security
treaty on its twentieth anniversary last year and the United
States and Japan now , concerning textiles,

find themselves on

the sarne side of the fence , looking at textile exports fro m
Korea and Taiwan.
From the i ssues of a decade ago , from the experience of
dealing v/i th those issues

1

We have learned we have more in

common than we have differences .

~~

have learned to seek joint

solutions to what apparently appears to many of thos e in the
news business as irreconcilable conflicts .
We learne d from the textile negotiations, for example, a
great deal about one another and the political nature of our
economies .

We are both free market economies heavily dependent

upon international trade , both have considerable capital in
foreign invest ments , both depend on imports -- Japan to a
greater degree -- of energy and raw materials .

Eut these

similarities do not mean we have learned enough to prevent the
r ecu rrence of bilateral trade disputes throughout this last
decade .

Part of the problem has been the turnaround of the

flow of products .

The United States had traditionally sold
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more to Japan than it bought .

But in the mid 1960s the balance

changed , and ever since Japan has enjoyed a trade surplus .
Du r ing the early 1970s the U. S. economy suffered from
slow g r oHth , inflation and balance of payment deficits whicr;
were par tly the result of the Vietnam conflict and partly
At the same time, Japan's economy was

industrial maturation .

g r owing robustly and the country enjoyed a substantial boon in
the American markets .

The disputes began .

In addition to the

problem over Japan ' s textile exports , there were bilateral
disagreements over exchange rates ,.and Japan's domestic uarket,
apparently closed to our exports.
And later in the decade , when Japan was more successful
than the United States in adjusting to soaring oil prices ,
Japan's large global current account surplus and bilateral
trade surplus with the United States aqain strained bilateral
relations .
v:hile I have served as Ar.tbassador to Japan we have had to
come to grips with a number of difficult bilateral trade
problems .

l~ e n

one considers the magnitude of the problems we

have faced and the willingness of both sides to make real
sacrifices to achieve r.;utually acceptable solutions , He can say·
that the strength of the relationship was truly tested .

And

made strony in the process .
I an not

surpris~d

I think it is simply inevitable

that there is occasional stress between the two largest

- 5economies in the free world.

Economic relations as close as

ours must now and then collide.

This was the case in 1977 and

1978 when the large Japanese global current account surplus,
the U.S. global current account deficit, a heavy imbalance in
bilateral trade, the Multilateral Trade Negotiations, the color
TV dumping charge, the steel issue and a number of other trade
problems clashed together, resulting in a period of almost
constant negotiation.

But we have emerged from this period

with only a few dents and our trade ties, and our friendship,
intact.
The Japanese Government cooperated greatly in resolving
the economic issues between our two countries.

In 1978 and

1979, it used fiscal policy to stimulate the economy and induce
increased consumption of imports.

At the same time, it

unilaterally cut tariffs on 318 items, removed quota controls
on 12 products and increased beef, citrus juice, and orange
quotas.

Japan ratified the codes negotiated in the MTN and

agreed to tariff reductions.

Since the end of the HTN, the

United States and Japan have agreed, in effect, to extend the
coverage of the government procurement code to
telecommunication equipment purchases by NTT and entered into
an understanding with us on product standards.
Most recently, Japan successfully defused protectionist
sentiment in the United States over the automobile problem by
voluntarily restraining its exports under a three year
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program.

No one is completely satisfied with constraints on

free trade, but perhaps that is an indication of how fairly
everyone has been asked to sacrifice.

President Reagan has

made it clear, as has Mr. Regan of the Treasury, that the
principle of free trade will be defended by this
administration.

Yet the situation in which the American auto

industry found itself

and the situation was not essentially

the fault of Japanese automakers -- generated understandable
concern within many members of the U.S. Congress.
by Japan to slow exports has lessened that concern.

The decision
The

American auto industry has a great deal of work to do before it
can get back on its feet, and this short breathing spell will
go a long way in ensuring that recovery.
This is the history of our relationship then:

He

recognize, as we did with the auto issue, that we are faced
with common problems.

A common chasm to cross

and we are

together using our shared experience to construct the arch
aross that chasm.

He have contructed , for example:

--A prestigious group of Japanese and Americans, led by
Ambassadors Ingersoll and Ushiba, vJas formed to assess our
expanding economic relationship in the larger context of our
shared global responsibilities

and to make recommendations.

This group, called the Wisemen, was unofficial and independent,
but its reports and recommendations meant that both sides are
now better informed about the varying perspectives -- the

- 7political, business, agricultural, labor, academic and
bureaucratic -- of our economic relationship.
--Tile United States-Japan Trade Study Group is a
voluntary group of Japanese and American businessmen and
government officials who together identify and analyze measures
in Japan which inhibit the sales of U.S. products and to
monitor the implementations of the HTN agreements.
--The United States-Japan Trade Facilitation Committee
was formed in September, 1977.

It has helped expand our trade

to Japan by identifying and dealing with specific problems
encountered by individual American businessmen when dealing
with Japanese laws or regulations.

It has reviewed 22 cases of

individual trade problems, of which it has satisfactorily
resolved 19.
We have learn ed that trade missions in both directions
can help to assuage protectionist pressures.

The Ikeda

Mission, in the spring of 1978, followed by the Export
Development Hissions to Japan and the Shin Sakura Haru, all
have served to facilitate the flow of American goods to Japan.
These examples are evidence of the mechanism we have put
in place to identify problems at an early stage and solve them
before they become unmanageable.

vle have been successful in

most cases because we have dealt with problems together.

Our

shared experiences have made us sensitive to the need to pay
the closest attention to our economic ties and has also given

8

us greater confidence in our ability to control events and
influence the directions in which our economies move.
So I am confident that our partnership will be able to
withstand future challenges and help to solve one of the nost
fundamental issues facing the industrial nations -- the
question of energy supplies.

At the advanced nations economic

summit in Tokyo in 1979, our countries made an important step
toward reducing consumption of oil and speeding production of
alternative sources.

The United States is still the world's

largest user of oil, but we have made significant progress in
our energy conservation program.
1978.

Oil consumption peaked in

Last year gasoline demand was down 8.5 percent and total

oil consumption down 10 percent from 1978 levels.

The United

8tates and Japan have joined together in a major cooperative
program to accelerate research and development .

The OPEC

member countries were faced with an apparent glut of oil during
mid-1981, and this has allowed us to replenish our reserves of
petroleu~

stocks.

problem.

The problem will exist as long as we must depend on

that

But this does not mean an end to the energy

one.~olitically

exploitable fuel.

We are approaching our ongoing discussions of defense in
the same spirit that
problems.

1~e

have sought solutions to the economic

We respect the accomplishments Japan has already

made in the defense area.

In light of the current

international situation, Japan, together with ourselves and our

-9European allies, must further strengthen our defense
capabilities to meet common security challenges.

The United

States will continue to encourage Japan to make steady and
significant improvements in their defense forces, while bearing
in mind Japan's constitutional constraints.

Japan has already

taken measures to strengthen its self-defense capabiiity,
including decisions to purchase the F-15, P-3C and E-2C as well
as other modern weapons systems.

Japan's increasing

contributions to the cost of maintaining our forces in this
country are most welcome and amount to almost $1 billion a
year.

In addition, American and Japanese unif~rmed services

are working together to develop more detailed contingency plans
in accordance with the planning guidelines adopted by our two
governments in 1978.
All of these developments enhance the credibility of
Japan's self-defense capability, and in so doing add strength
to the U.S.-Japan security relationship and the contribution it
makes to the peace and stability of East Asia.

Although the

United States favors continued progress in this area and
recognizes that this would entail commensurate increases in
Japanese defense spending , we will not presume to tell Japan
how to spend the money it budgets for defense.

Cur countries

maintain a continuing dialogue on all of these isssues, as is
proper and necessary in an alliance.

However, the United

States recognizes and respects _the fact that the pace, the

-Wextent and the direction of any increase in Japan's defense
efforts remain, as they have always been, sovereign decisions
for Japan to make.
Japan is showing more self-confidence in international
affairs.

Over the past years there has been visible increase

in the scope and activism of Japanese diplomacy.

Some argue

that Japan's political influence in the world, and its
diplomatic reach, have not expanded as rapidly as has its
economic power and worldwide network of economic interests.
But even they would have to agree that in the past few years
that anomaly has been significantly reduced as Japan has taken
on major political responsibilities in a number of areas.
First of all, Japan is taking on greater responsibilities
for foreign economic development.
doubled its foreign assistance.

From 1976 to 1980 Japan
In 1981 Japan expects to spend

Y889 billion and from 1981 to 1985 it intends to again double
the amount it spent on foreign assistance during the five
previous years.

Through economic assistance to such

strategically important nations as Thailand, Turkey , Pakistan
and Egypt, Japan makes valuable contributions to our common
security interests.
Secondly, Japan's relations with ASEAN countries can no
longer be defined solely in economic terms .

Japan's political

and diplomatic support for those nations, no less than its
large and indispensable contriqution to the Indochina refugee

,
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relief effort, has added new depth to its role in that region.
The United States and Japan continue along parallel lines
(trans: note) in our relations with the non-communist nations
of Southeast Asia.

\~

share similar interests there, both

seeking to contribute to the resilience and the independence of
those nations.

Our policies are not coordinated, and indeed we

are in some respect competitors there.

But our competition is

healthy and our approaches--as exemplified by our participation
in the

ASEA~

meeting in Manila this past June--are

complementary.
In addition, there has been a growing political dimension
to Japan's ties with the nations of Hestern Europe.

Two

factors that have encouraged this process have been Japan's
active participation in the OECD and its key role in the annual
economic summit meetings of the major industrialized
countries.

The development of close trilateral coordination

was seen in the need to develop a common response to the
Iranian hostage situation and the Soviet invasion of
'"

Afghani stan.

vlhi le its full inpact may not be felt for a

number of years, its meaning is clear--Japan is going to play
an increasingly important and varied role in the world.
During the period when our Embassy in Iran was seized,
Japan spoke out vigorously on behalf of legal and humanitarian
principles, denounced the hostage seizure and called for the
release of those innocent people.

It joined with our European
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friends and others around the world in imposing economic
sanctions against Iran which helped lead to the release of the
hostages.

Japan's actions were by no means risk free; indeed,

among our allies, Japan paid a high price to stand by us, and
for that we are grateful.
And, in respect to Afghanistan as well, Japan worked
closely witl1 the United States and our other allies to impose
penalities upon the Soviet Union for its invasion of that
country and to insure that the Soviets understand that such
actions can be taken without grave risk.
against the aggression,

Japan spoke out early

joined the United States and other

nations in boycotting the Moscow Glympic games, and
participated in a framework of sanctions which we still hope
will have an important cumulative effect.
The challenges posed by events in Iran and Afghanistan,
like some of the economic and trade problems we have had to
grapple with in the past few years, have imposed some strains
on our relations.

Difficult decisions have been made.

choices were in order.

Hard

Although a satisfactory solution to the

Soviet occupation of Afghanistan appears elusive, the degree of
unity and coordinated action of Japan, the United States and
our other friends is most heartening.

We have occasionally

differed on tactics, on emphasis or on timing, but we have
remained united and are determined to stay the course.

As a

result of joint action in response to the situations in Iran

-~-

and Afghanistan there more understanding of the multilateral
responsibilities inherent in the phrase, U.S.-Japan relations.
And there is noH a stronger commitment, on both sides of the
Pacific, to mutual goals and joint action in achieving them.
'
I have traveled throughout Japan and I have spoken
often

in many places about the steady progress of our two nations
toward a more equal partnership, about Japan assuming
international responsibilities commensurate with its economic
power.

But only recently has this concept begun to be accepted

by the Japanese people.

The crises in Iran and Afghanistan in

particular have contributed to this phenomenon.

Clearly,

during the situation in Iran the United States needed the
support of its friends -- in Japan, in Europe and elsewhere.
Events in both Iran and Afghanistan threatened the interests of
the international community as whole and required a united
response by peace-loving nations.

Japan responded to those

needs, demonstrating in the process--for its own people, for
Americans and for the world--that Japan is a factor to be
reckoned wiU1 on the international scene, and that the arch of
our partnership is firm in more than just matters of trade.
Japan's increasingly important role in the world has
implication for all nations.

For the United States it means

that the ties with Japan, already the most important bilateral
reltionship we have, will take pn even greater significance.
It is even more essential that we consult closely with each

-~-

other and try to coordinate our policies as much as we can.
The general orientation of our foreign policies will no doubt
remain parallel (trans: note), resting as they do on a
foundation of similar values, intersts and objectives.

Thus

there is no reason to expect any diminution in Japanese and
American cooperation vis-a-vis major international issues, be
they political, economic, scientific or security-related.

On

the contrary, I believe our partnership will deepen and produce
major benefits, not only for Japan and the United States, but
for the world.
I believe that is so because I have personally
experienced our growing relationship and as historian Henry
tl

II

Brooks Adams said, experience is the arch to build upon.

jo/js

